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Appellee Burgess by holding that any modification of a writ-
ten sales contract between a real estate broker and its 
seller client had to be in writing and signed by the seller 
to satisfy the requirement of the Statute of Frauds, Section 
25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
Because this is an appeal from a granting of sum-
mary judgment and presents only questions of law, the stan-
dard of review is for correctness, Gaw v. State of Utah, 143 
U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 09/13/90); Transamerica Cash Res., Inc. 
v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). The 
facts and inferences must be analyzed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. Provo City Corp. v. State, 
137 U.A.R. 8 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Section 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some not or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee (hereinafter "Mr. Burgess") is the owner 
of certain real property located at 3175 East Wind River 
Drive in Layton, Utah (hereinafter "the property"). 
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Complaint, paragraph #3, R at 2. On or about July 26, 1988, 
Mr. Burgess executed and delivered to Appellants 
Homestead Realtors and its Realtor, Warren Burbank, 
(hereinafter "the brokers"), a Sales Agency Contract by 
which terms Mr. Burgess retained Homestead Realtors for the 
purpose of listing and selling the property, R, at 85, 
(hereinafter "the Contract"). The Contract was for six (6) 
months, with an expiration date of January 25, 1989, and 
provided for a six (6) percent broker's commission, R at 83. 
On January 26, 1989, Burbank telephoned Mr. Burgess 
and obtained an oral agreement to extend the Contract for an 
additional three months, until April 26, 1989 (Affidavit of 
Warren Burbank, R at 76-77). Mr. Burgess did not sign any 
written extension of the Contract, Plaintiff1s Reply to 
Defendant's First Request for Admissions, number 2, (R, at 
)• 
Subsequent to January 26, 1989, the Property was 
shown to William and Sandra Roberts, who submitted an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on March 1, 1989 
(Affidavit of Warren Burbank, R at 89-90). Mr. Burgess 
signed the Earnest Money Receipt on March 3, 1989 (Affidavit 
of Warren Burbank, R, at 89-90). Mr. Burgess was notified 
by United Savings Bank that the Robertses had tendered the 
money which was due from them in order to complete their 
obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt, R, at 82. Mr. 
Burgess refused to sign and complete the closing, R at 82. 
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The record does not contain any evidence that Mr. Burgess 
ever sold the property, and, in fact, the property was not 
sold. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under existing Utah case law, a listing agreement 
authorizing or employing a broker to sell real estate for 
compensation must be in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged, and so must any modification of such a listing 
agreement. Mr. Burgess did not sign any modification 
document, and, therefore, Judge Page correctly granted him 
summary judgment. The two cases relied upon by the Brokers, 
one from Illinois and one from Oregon, are inapposite. The 
Illinois case, Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates v. Ratner, 
133 111. App.3d 316, 478 N.E.2d 1138 (1985), concerned an 
oral argument to modify a written extension clause in the 
agency contract, while in the present case, there was no 
written extension clause. The Oregon case, Wieneke 
Properties, Inc. v. Thiessen, 94 Or. App. 306, 765 P.2d 815 
(1988) was based upon prior Oregon case law which had held 
that a written extension of time is not required to satisfy 
the analogous Oregon statute of frauds, whereas Utah case 
law has required a modification to be in writing. 
Really, what the Brokers are trying to do is 
recover in quantum meruit, which, in fact, was part of the 
basis for the Bennett & Kahnweiler decision. Not only does 
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Utah not permit a broker to recover in quantum meruit, 
Machan Hampshire Properties v. Western Real Estate and 
Development Company, 779 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989), Young v. 
Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), but, even if such recov-
ery were permitted, the Brokers in this case were not enti-
tled to it because Mr. Burgess never sold the property and, 
hence, has not been enriched. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER UTAH LAW, A LISTING AGREEMENT 
AUTHORIZING OR EMPLOYING AN AGENT OR 
BROKER TO SELL REAL ESTATE FOR 
COMPENSATION MUST BE IN WRITING, SIGNED 
BY THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE CHARGED, AND SO 
MUST ANY MODIFICATION THEREOF. 
Utahfs Statute of Frauds states in pertinent part: 
The following agreements are 
void unless the agreement, or some note 
or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(5) Every agreement authoriz-
ing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
Section 25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. In the 
present case, there is no valid agreement in writing that 
was in effect on March 3, 1989. In the district court the 
brokers alleged two bases for a written agreement satisfying 
the statute: (1) The Sales Agency Contract, R at 85, and 
(2) The Earnest Money Receipt, R at 89-90. However, on 
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appeal, the brokers apparently have not argued that the 
Earnest Money Receipt is a written memorandum sufficient to 
satisfy the statute of frauds, so counsel will address only 
the Sales Agency Contract. 
Under Section 25-5-4(5), supra, a broker must 
allege and prove an "express contract or agreement of 
authority in which the terms and conditions of employment, 
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are stated," 
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920) (emphasis 
added), and that such contract is in writing. C.J. Realty, 
Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988). This partic-
ular statute of frauds is part of the entire regulatory 
scheme applicable to real estate brokerage transactions. 
C.J. Realty, supra. 
The contract, by its own terms, had expired prior 
to the date on which the brokers showed the property to Mr. 
and Mrs. Roberts, R at 89-90, but for purposes of this 
Court's review, Mr. Burgess must be held to have extended, 
verbally, the time of the Contract for 90 days beyond the 
expiration date, R at 76-77. It has long been the law in 
Utah that where an original agreement is required to be in 
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, any subsequent 
modification of that agreement must also be in writing in 
order to be valid. The Utah Supreme Court recognized this 
rule in Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 
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(Utah 1985). [See also, SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 
732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986); Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 
538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975). In Golden Key Realty, supra, the 
supreme court held: 
...The rule is well settled in 
Utah that if an original agreement is 
within the statute of frauds, a subse-
quent agreement which modifies the origi-
nal written agreement must also satisfy 
the requirements of the statute of frauds 
to be enforceable. 699 P.2d 730, at 732. 
Thus, the extension of the durational time period of the 
original Sales Agency Contract must not only have been 
signed by Mr. Burgess, but must have set forth expressly all 
of the conditions mentioned in Case v. Ralph, supra, and 
C.J. Realty, supra. The verbal extension is void under 
Golden Key Realty because the modification was not in 
writing. 
The brokers cite to two cases, from Illinois and 
Oregon, in support of their contention that this is a case 
of first impression in Utah and that this Court should fol-
low the reasoning of the courts of these other states. 
Appellee disagrees with both of these assertions. First, 
this is not a case of first impression, as mentioned above. 
Appellee's position is that an extension of time is a 
modification of the agreement, and must be in writing, 
Golden Key Realty, supra, and see discussion, below, of 
Franke v. Blair Realty Co. , 119 Ohio St. 338, 164 N.E. 353 
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(1928). Secondly, both cases cited by Appellants are 
distinguishable. 
At least one court of another jurisdiction has 
ruled that time of performance of a listing-type agreement 
is an essential term, the varying of which is a 
modification. In Franke v. Blair Realty Co., 119 Ohio St. 
338, 164 N.E. 353 (1928), the essential facts were as 
follows: On February 28, 1926, the owner of real estate 
listed his property with a broker and agreed in writing to 
pay the broker a commission for finding a purchaser with the 
specified period of five days. At the end of the five days, 
the owner orally promised to extend indefinitely the time of 
performance. In reliance upon the owner's oral promise, the 
broker continued its efforts to find a buyer. Meanwhile, 
the owner, in disregard of his oral promise, hired another 
broker at a reduced commission, and consummated a sale with 
a buyer with whom the first broker was also negotiating. 
The lower court ruled in favor of the first broker's claim 
for a commission, and the owner appealed. 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, and remanded for a 
dismissal of the claim, based upon the owner's motion that 
the claim was barred by the Ohio statute of frauds (almost 
identical to Utah's, see 164 N.E. 353, at 354). In deter-
mining whether the oral promise was a material change in the 
terms of the contract, the Ohio Supreme Court held: 
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The contract attempted to be 
avoided by oral agreement was a definite 
contract signed by the defendant that he 
would pay a commission if the property 
was sold "before the expiration of this 
agreement •If The oral agreement was a new 
contract affecting the time of 
performance, and, by substituting a new 
time of performance, varied an essential 
term of the written contract. To hold 
otherwise would be to nullify the provi-
sions of the statute of frauds with 
respect to real estate commission 
contracts. 164 N.E. 353, at 355 
(emphasis added). 
The Franke case is significant also in that the 
owner in Franke was the instigator and moving force in 
procuring the oral extension of time, whereas in the present 
case, a review of Warren Burbankfs affidavit, R, at 89-90, 
shows that it was the broker who initiated and pushed for 
the oral extension of time of performance. 
In Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates v. Rattner, 133 
111. App. 3d 316, 478 N.E. 2d 1138 (1985), the original 
written listing agreement provided that the broker was enti-
tled to a commission if the property was disposed of within 
180 days after the termination date, if the lessee was a 
prospect to whom the property had been submitted during the 
term of the agreement, provided the prospect fs name was 
submitted to the lessor within ten days following the 
termination of the agreement. What happened in Bennett & 
Kahnweiler was that the broker had procured a prospective 
lessee prior to the expiration of the agreement, had submit-
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ted its name to the lessor within ten days of the 
termination of the agreement, but, due to the lessor's 
footdragging, and various other negotiations, the lease was 
not finalized signed until 207 days after the termination 
date. The lessor, Ratner, refused to pay the broker, 
Bennett & Kahnweiler, its commission. 
The Illinois Appellate Court noted that the origi-
nal listing agreement contained the extension clause, in 
writing, and that the written extension clause generated no 
rights or duties not already present in the listing 
agreement. Thus, the original written agreement 
contemplated, in writing, performance after the agreement's 
termination date. In the present case, the Contract 
contained no such extension clause, and the oral extension 
granted by Mr. Burgess was really a modification. In fact, 
in the district court, the Appellants argued that the rule 
of law in Wieneke Properties, Inc. v. Thiessen, 96 Or. App. 
306, 765 P.2d 815 (Or. App. 1988) and, by implication, 
Bennett & Kahnweiler, supra, was applied by this court in 
Hurlburt v. Gullo, 750 P. 2d 613 (Utah App. 1988). However, 
the handwritten lease in Hurlburt read as follows: 
April 18, 1983 
Don Foote agrees to lease approx. 5 acres 
with water, located at 1805 W. 400 N. , 
Slaterville, to Don Hurlburt for $150.00 
per year. Don Hurlburt has the option to 
extend lease for an additional five years 
at the same terms ... 750 P.2d 613, at 
614 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, Hurlburt and Bennett & Kahnweiler, are distinguishable 
because in both cases the written contract sought to be 
extended contemplated extension by its own express terms, 
with only the notice of election being oral. In the present 
case, the Sales Agency Contract contains no such express 
renewal or extension provisions. 
Wieneke Properties, Inc. v. Thiessen, supra, 
appears to be more on point for Appellants, in that it did 
not concern a written extension-of-time clause. Appellants 
argue that Wieneke Properties supports their position that a 
written extension of time is not required to satisfy Utah's 
relevant Statute of Frauds. In Wieneke, however, the Oregon 
Appellate Court, relied upon prior Oregon case law that had 
already established that a written extension of time was not 
required if the parties expressly agreed, citing Ferris v. 
Meeker Fertilizer Co., 258 Or. 377, 482 P.2d 523 (1971). As 
argued above, prior Utah case law is to the contrary, see, 
e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985) (modification of original agreement within statute of 
frauds must also satisfy statute of frauds). Thus, Wieneke 
Properties is also distinguishable, and this fact situation, 
involving a modification, is not a case of first impression. 
POINT II. APPELLANTS ARE REALLY ATTEMPTING TO 
RECOVER IN QUANTUM MERUIT, WHICH UTAH 
LAW PROHIBITS. 
It is submitted that Appellants are really attempt-
ing to recover their commission under a quantum meruit 
-11-
theory. One of the cases cited by them, Bennett & 
Kahnweiler, supra, was decided partly upon a quantum meruit 
basis, see 478 N.E.2d 1138 (111. App. 1985), at 1141, citing 
the cases of Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Comco Corp. , 63 111. 
App. 3d 362, 380 N.E.2d 15 (1978) and Dickerson Realtors, 
Inc. v. Frewert, 16 111. App. 3d 1060, 307 N.E.2d 445 
(1974), for the rule that it would be inequitable to allow 
the principal to benefit from a broker's services without 
meeting the burden of payment of the broker's commission. 
This would, in fact, appear to contradict Appellants1 asser-
tion in their brief, that neither Illinois nor Oregon allows 
a real estate broker to recover a commission under a quantum 
meruit theory (Brief of Appellant, p. 12, lines 7-9). 
Utah does not allow a real estate broker to recover 
in quantum meruit. In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 
1953), the Utah Supreme Court held that a broker or agent 
may recover only by virtue of a contract, and cannot recover 
upon the basis of quantum meruit. [See also, Watson v. 
Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P.2d 772 (1924); Case v. Ralph, 56 
Utah 243, 188 P.640 (1920)]. In the Young case, the Supreme 
Court held: 
Doubtless plaintiff rendered 
some measure of services resulting in Mr. 
Kingfs purchase of defendant's property. 
It has long been established in this 
jurisdiction, however, that a broker or 
agent may recover only by virtue of con-
tract and cannot recover upon the basis 
of quantum meruit. 259 P. 2d 876, at 
877. 
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Any unfairness or harshness in this rule and its 
results addressed recently by this Court in Machan Hampshire 
Properties v. Western Real Estate & Development Company, 779 
P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989). In footnote 8, it was noted: 
Although application of the 
statute may lead to harsh results where a 
real estate broker's labors go 
uncompensated, a broker must be presumed 
to know that an oral contract of 
employment for rendition of services in 
negotiating a sale of real estate for a 
commission is invalid. Gray v. Kohlhase, 
18 Ariz. App. 368, 502 P. 2d 169, 172 
(1972). A broker who fails to secure 
written authorization assumes the risk of 
relying on oral promises and has no cause 
to complain if efforts go unrewarded. 
Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp. v. Western 
Pac. R.R., 47 Cal.2d 62, 301 P.2d 825, 
831 (1963). 
Judge Orme, concurring in Machan Hampshire Properties, also 
observed: 
While this may seem a harsh 
result, it does not require our apology. 
The very adoption of a statute of frauds 
reflects the Legislature's considered 
judgment that, with certain kinds of very 
important arrangements, it is preferable 
to invalidate a few otherwise legitimate 
agreements because they were not written 
than to burden the system and the citi-
zenry with claims premised on bogus, 
unwritten agreements. 779 P. 2d 230, at 
237. 
Licensed real estate brokers doubtless are aware of 
the requirements of the Statute of frauds. It would have 
been a simple matter to obtain Mr. Burgess's signature on 
either a new listing agreement or an extension embodying all 
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material terms. This was not done and the brokers are pro-
hibited from recovering in quantum meruit. Even if they 
were not, since the property did not sell, Mr. Burgess was 
not unjustly enriched at the broker's expense. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah statutory and case law requires a listing 
agreement to be in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged, and also requires that any modification of such 
listing agreement also be in writing, in order to satisfy 
the requirements of Utah's statute of frauds relating to the 
sale of real estate by a broker. Varying the durational 
period of such a listing agreement constitutes a 
modification of an essential term, and it must be in writing 
as mentioned above. In the present case, the brokers fail 
to procure any such written extension, and the oral 
extension granted by Mr. Burgess does not satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds. The district court was therefore correct in 
granting summary judgment to Mr. Burgess and dismissing the 
Broker's Complaint with prejudice. Mr. Burgess requests 
that this court affirm in its entirety the decision of the 
district court and award him his costs on appeal. 
DATED this /-V*^ day of ( j7jjJ&^~ 1990. 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Appellee 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
***** 
WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER 
HOMES AND GARDENS, ET AL., 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
R. DAVID BURGESS, 
DEFENDANT, 
BENCH RULING 
Civil No. 890745358 
• * * * * « * -
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable Rodney S. Paae, Judge, 
sitting at Farmmgton, Utah on the 10th day of April 1990. 
Whereupon the following proceedings were had, to wit: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
For the plaintiffs: 
For the defendant: 
Philip C. Patterson 
Martin W. Custen 
***** 
FARMINGTON, UTAH APRIL 10, 1990 11:30 A.M. 
THE COURT: The Court will make the following 
ruling in the matter: First of all, it is clear these 
parties initially entered into a listing aareement which 
they both executed and which expired by its terms on the 
26th of January 1989. The Court finds, and I think the law 
requires, that any agreement for compensation between a 
D E A N C . D L S E N , C . S . R„ 
2QQC5CWX M X403C }©€«&CK 
1 a broker and a seller has to be in writing. And I think 
2 it's clear from the Machan aqreement — or excuse me, Machan 
3 case that our Court of Appeals and the other cases indicate 
4
 that the Supreme Court is going to hold brokers and realtors 
5 to a higher degree than they would other people. They've 
6 chosen to do that for whatever reason. I think that's 
7 evidenced by the fact that the theory of part performance 
8 and the theory of quantum meruit are not available in those 
9 kind of cases. 
10 In this particular case, there is no other evidence 
11 or writing of any nature which essentially extends the 
12 listing agreement here in question. The only possible 
13 connection would be the earnest money closing — the earnest 
14 money agreement which makes no reference to either — any 
15 kind of a listing agreement or any kind of a commission 
16 statement. 
17 I think there is no question that in order to avoid 
18
 the requirement of statute of frauds, there must be some 
19 kind of writing which would come within the purview of meet-
20 ing the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
21 The Court further finds that the law in the State of 
22 Utah requires that a writing which in fact falls within the 
23 statute of frauds, which does not in and of itself provide 
24 for an exception thereto, requires that any agreement to 
25 modify or change or extend that agreement at least so far 
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as it involves brokerage agreements has to meet the 
requirements of the statute of frauds also. 
The Court finds that in this case, there is no such 
evidence. And there is no such writing or agreement or 
document signed by the person sought to be charged so as 
to comply with that requirement. And for that reason, the 
Court would grant the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The Court will ask, Mr. Custen, that you prepare a 
finding and order in accordance with this Court's ruling. 
That that should be submitted to Mr. Patterson so he can 
make sure whatever he wants is in there in the event he 
chooses to have this reviewed by a higher court. But that 
will be the order of the Court in this matter. 
MR. CUSTEN: Thank you. We'd like —• we will order 
a transcript of the — from Mr. Olsen, if that's okay, your 
Honor. 
Sure. 
You still have my address, I assume? 
THE COURT: 
MR. CUSTEN: 
Send it to me. 
THE COURT: 
MR. CUSTEN: 
Thank you, counsel. 
Thank you, your Honor, 
***** 
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1 CERTIFICATE 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
3 I COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
4 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing three pages of 
5 transcript constitute a true and accurate record of the 
6 proceedings to the best of my knowledge and ability as a 
7 certified shorthand reporter in and for the State of Utah. 
8 Dated at Farmington, Utah this 10th day of April 1990. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER 
HOMES AND GARDENS, NORMA 
ZAMPEDRI, HOMESTEAD 
and WARREN BURBANK, 
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vs. 
R. DAVID BURGESS, 
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r
FINDING AND ORDER OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
Civil No. 45358 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing on April 10, 1990 on defendant's Motion for an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment against plaintiffs and each of 
them on ground that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact in this action and that defendant is entitled 
to judgment in his favor as a matter of law. The Motion was 
based on the file in this case, the pleadings herein, and 
the Affidavits of Warren Burbank and Norma Zampedri on file 
herein, and on all of the papers and documents filed in sup-
port of the Motion, including Memoranda of Law. 
Defendant appeared by his attorney, Martin W* 
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Custen of Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custen, and the plaintiffs 
appeared by their attorney, Philip C. Patterson. On due 
consideration of the records and files in this matter, the 
original and all other pleadings, the Affidavits of Warren 
Burbank and Norma Zampedri, all other papers and documents 
filed by the parties herein, the oral argument of counsel 
for the respective parties and the Memoranda of Law filed by 
counsel, and being duly advised in the premises, the Court 
now enters the following findings in support of its summary 
judgment ruling: 
1. The parties initially entered into a listing 
agreement which both indicated and which by its terms 
expired on January 26, 1989. 
2. Any agreement for compensation between a real 
estate broker and a seller has to be in writing pursuant to 
Section 25-5-4 (5) Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
3. Any broker's agreement required to come within 
the statute of frauds by the law of the State of Utah, which 
does not in of itself provide for an exception thereto, can 
be modified, changed or extended only by another agreement 
that satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
4. In this case, the undisputed facts reveal that 
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there is no such document or evidence of any document signed 
by the defendant, whereby the defendant agreed in writing to 
extend or modify the terms of the original listing 
agreement, which original agreement expired on January 26, 
1989. 
Based upon the above, it is the Court's opinion and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant is entitled as a 
matter of law to a summary judgment dismissing the 
plaintiff's Complaint. 
Let a judgment be entered accordingly* 
DATED this \J<"1 day of fj^A 
BY THE COURT: 
, 1990-
PHILIP C. PATTERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
ML 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that on this / ^ day of 
April, 1990, I mailed a true and correct original and copy 
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of the above and foregoing Finding and Order of Summary 
Judgment, postage prepaid, to Philip C. Patterson, attorney 
for plaintiffs, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, UT 84401. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY CORPORATION BETTER 
HOMES AND GARDENS, NORMA 
ZAMPEDRI, HOMESTEAD 
and WARREN BURBANK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R. DAVID BURGESS, 
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JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 45358 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter having come on for hear-
ing on April 10, 1990 before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, 
District Court Judge, on defendant's Motion for an Order 
granting defendant's summary judgment of dismissal of the 
plaintiff's Complaint against all plaintiffs, and the Court, 
having already entered its Order granting summary judgment 
to defendant having therein directed entry of a judgment of 
dismissal in accordance therewith. 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
plaintiff's Complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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DATED this # day of W Of , 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
PHILIP Cu PATTERSON 
Attorney Yifor Plaintiffs 
M. RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that on this / 'S* day of 
April, 1990, I mailed a true and correct original and copy 
of the above and foregoing Judgment Dismissing Complaint, 
postage prepaid, to Philip C. Patterson, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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